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Abstract
Many if not most markets with network externalities are two-sided. To succeed,
platforms in industries such as software, portals and media, payment systems and
the Internet, must “get both sides of the market on board ”. Accordingly, platforms
devote much attention to their business model, that is to how they court each side
while making money overall. The paper builds a model of platform competition
with two-sided markets. It unveils the determinants of price allocation and end-
user surplus for different governance structures (profit-maximizing platforms and
not-for-profit joint undertakings), and compares the outcomes with those under an
integrated monopolist and a Ramsey planner.
1 Introduction
Buyers of videogame consoles want games to play on; game developers pick platforms
that are or will be popular among gamers. Cardholders value credit or debit card only to
the extent that these are accepted by the merchants they patronize; affiliated merchants
benefit from a widespread diffusion of cards among consumers. More generally, many
if not most markets with network externalities are characterized by the presence of two
progress made in the last two decades on the economics of network externalities and
widespread strategy discussions of the chicken-and-egg problem, two-sided markets have
received scant attention. The purpose of this paper is to start filling this gap.
The recognition that many markets are multi-sided leads to new and interesting, pos-
itive and normative questions. Under multi-sidedness, platforms must choose a price
structure and not only a price level for their service. For example, videogame platforms
such as Sony, Sega and Nintendo make money on game developers through per-unit royal-
ties on games and fixed fees for development kits and treat the gamers side as a loss leader.
Interestingly, operating system platforms for the PC and handheld devices have adopted
the opposite business model and aim at making money on consumers. The choice of a
business model seems to be key to the success of a platform and receives much corporate
attention. Table 1 provides a few illustrations1 of the two-sided markets and shows that
platforms often treat one side as a profit center and the other as a loss leader, or, at best,
as financially neutral. A number of these illustrations are discussed in “mini-case studies”
in section 7. And Table 2 lists a few important segments of the new economy that will be
searching for a proper business model in the next few years. Such conventional wisdom
about business models found in the trade press and summarized in Table 1 is of course
subject to criticism. To reason in terms of profit centers, costs are often “intuitively,” but
1There are of course other illustrations, for example scientific journals, that must match readers and
authors. Interestingly, the Bell Journal of Economics for a number of years after it was launched was
sent for free to anyone who requested it. There is currently much discussion of how the business model
for scientific journals will evolve with electronic publishing. The list of social gatherings examples of
cross-subsidization could be extended to include dating or marital agencies which may charge only one
side of the market.
A couple of explanations regarding markets that will not be discussed in section 7: Social gatherings:
celebrities often do not pay or are paid to come to social happenings as they attract other participants
(who may then be charged an hefty fee); similarly, in some conferences, star speakers are paid while
others pay. Real estate: In many countries buyers are not charged for visiting real estate properties and
thus marginal visits are heavily subsidized. To be certain, the sale price reflects the real estate agency
fee, but this does not imply that the arrangement is neutral (see section 8). Shopping malls: shoppers are
subsidized. They don’t pay for parking; in France they can also buy gasoline at a substantial discount.
Discount coupon books : These are given away to consumers. Intermediaries charge merchants for the
service. Browsers: The picture given in Table 1 is a bit simplistic. In particular, Netscape initially made
about one third of its revenue on the client side before giving the software away. But Netscape always
viewed the software running on top of the operating system on the web servers as a major source of profit.
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arbitrarily allocated to either side of the market. Yet, the conventional wisdom points at
some more fundamental logic related to prices and surpluses on both sides of the market.
A major objective of our paper is to unveil this logic and the determinants of the choice
of a business model.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF EXISTING BUSINESS MODELS
Product loss leader/break-even seg-
ment/ subsidized segment
profit-making segment/ subsi-
dizing segment
SOFTWARE
Videogames consumers (consoles) software developers
Streaming media consumers servers
Browsers users web servers
Operating systems (Win-
dows; Palm, Pocket PC)
application developers (devel-
opment tools, support, func-
tionality,...)
clients
Text processing reader/viewer writer
PORTALS AND MEDIA
Portals “eyeballs” advertizers
Newspapers readers advertizers
(Charge-free) TV networks viewers advertizers
PAYMENT SYSTEMS
Credit and differed debit
cards (Visa, MasterCard,
Amex,...)
cardholders merchants
On-line debit cards merchants cardholders
(continued...)
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(continued...)
OTHERS...
Social gatherings celebrities in social happen-
ings
other participants
Shopping malls consumers (free parking,
cheap gas,...)
shops
Discount coupon books consumers merchants
(Want Advertizer)
(Legacy) Internet websites dial-up consumers
Real estate buyers sellers
Table 1: existing business models
LOOKING FORWARD:
Platform Two sides Instruments of cost allocation
or cross-subsidization
B2B buyers / sellers design of auctions, informa-
tion flows,...
Internet backbone services consumers / websites termination (settlement)
charges
Pools and standards relevant sides level of royalties, inclusiveness
of pools,...
Software as a service (.Net vs
Java,...)
consumers / application de-
velopers
development tools and other
efforts to create an appli-
cations development environ-
ment, backward compatibil-
ity, pricing,...
Table 2: prospective applications
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From both a positive and a normative viewpoints, two-sided markets differ from the
textbook treatment of multiproduct oligopoly or monopoly. The interaction between the
two sides gives rise to strong complementarities, but the corresponding externalities are
not internalized by end users, unlike in the multiproduct literature (the same consumer
buys the razor and the razor blade). In this sense, our theory is a cross between net-
work economics, which emphasizes such externalities, and the literature on (monopoly or
competitive) multiproduct pricing, which stresses cross-elasticities. For example, socially
optimal “Ramsey” prices are not driven solely by superelasticity formulae but also reflect
each side’s contribution to the other side’s surplus.
Some new questions raised by two-sided markets are more specific to the existence of
competition between platforms. In a number of markets, a fraction of end users on one
or the two sides connect to several platforms. Using the Internet terminology, we will
say that they multihome. For example, many merchants accept both American Express
and Visa; furthermore, some consumers have an Amex and a Visa cards in their pock-
ets. Many consumers have the Internet Explorer and the Netscape browsers installed on
their PC, and a number of websites are configured optimally for both browsers. Read-
ers may subscribe to multiple newspapers, B2B exchange members may buy or sell their
wares on several exchanges, and real estate sellers and buyers may use the services of
multiple real estate agencies. Competitive prices on one market then depend on the ex-
tent of multihoming on the other side of the market. For example, when Visa reduces
the (transaction-proportional) charge paid by the merchants,2 merchants become more
tempted to turn down the more costly Amex card as long as a large fraction of Amex
customers also owns a Visa card. More generally, multihoming on one side intensifies
price competition on the other side as platforms use low prices in an attempt to “steer”
end users on the latter side toward an exclusive relationship.3
2The mechanism through which this reduction operates is indirect and is described in section 7.
3The occurence of steering is easiest to visualize in those illustrations in which platforms charge per-
end-user-transaction fees: The seller of a house or a B2B supplier may only list the house or the wares
on the cheapest platform.
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The paper studies how the price allocation between the two sides of the market is
affected by a) platform governance (for-profit vs not-for-profit), b) end users’ cost of mul-
tihoming, c) platform differentiation, d) platforms’ ability to use volume-based pricing, e)
the presence of same-side externalities, and f) platform compatibility. It also investigates
how privately optimal pricing structures compare with socially optimal ones.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the simplest version of the
model, in which end-users incur no fixed cost and platform pricing is linear on both
sides of the market, and analyzes the (profit maximizer and Ramsey planner) monopoly
benchmarks. Section 3 derives equilibrium behavior when two (for-profit or not-for-profit)
platforms compete. Section 4 obtains some comparative statics in order to help predict
the choice of business model. Section 5 compares the price structures in the case of linear
demands. Section 6 generalizes the model and results in order to allow for fixed user
costs and nonlinear platform pricing. Section 7 summarizes the main results and provides
seven “mini case studies” to illustrate how our theory may shed light on existing and
future business models. Last, Section 8 concludes with some general considerations about
two-sided markets.
As we discussed, our work puts network economics and multiproduct pricing together.
From the early work of Rohlfs (1974) to the recent theoretical advances and applications
to antitrust through the pioneering work of Katz-Shapiro (1985, 1986) and Farrell-Saloner
(1985, 1986), a large body of literature has developed on network industries. To make
progress, however, this literature has ignored multisidedness and the price allocation ques-
tion. In contrast, the competitive multiproduct pricing literature (e.g., Baumol et al 1982,
Wilson 1993) has carefully described the interdependency of pricing decisions but it has
In industries in which platforms do not charge per-end-user-transaction fees, steering is more subtle
as it operates through effort substitution. For example, a software platform offering better software
development kits, support, and application programming interfaces not only encourages the development
of applications optimized to this platform, but is also likely to induce application developers to devote
less attention to rival platforms. A portal or TV network’s cut in advertising rates induces advertisers
to advertise more on their medium and to substitute away from other media. A shopping mall’s cut in
rental prices or improved layout may induce a shop to increase its size or appeal and lead the latter to
neglect or abandon its outlets in rival shopping malls. And so forth.
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not considered the affiliation externalities that lie at the core of the network economics lit-
erature. In contrast with the buyer of a razor, who internalizes the impact of his purchase
on the demand and surplus attached to razor blades, our end-users do not internalize the
impact of their purchase on the other side of the market.
Our paper is most closely related to the recent theoretical literature on chicken-and-
egg problems. This literature however assumes either that there is a monopoly platform
(Baye-Morgan 2001, Rochet-Tirole 2000, Schmalensee 2000) or that platforms are fully
interconnected (Laffont et al 2001) and so end-users enjoy the same level of connectivity
regardless of the platform they select. Parker and Van Alstyne (2000) study monopoly
pricing in a situation in which the demand for one good depends (linearly) on its price and
on the quantity of the other good sold. They characterize the price structure as a function
of the network externality coefficients. They then look at the incentive of a producer of a
good to enter a (complementary or substitute) market with another incumbent producer.
With complements, entry losses may be profitable because entry puts pressure on price
and boosts the profit of the core business. Caillaud and Jullien (2001) study competition
among intermediaries. In their model, platforms act as matchmakers and can use sophis-
ticated pricing (registration fees, and possibly transaction fees provided the intermediaries
observe transactions). Indeed, one of their contributions is to show that dominant firms
are better off charging transactions rather than registrations when deterring entry. They
also show that competition is more intense when platforms cannot deter multihoming.
Their contribution is complementary to ours. For example, it assumes homogeneous pop-
ulations on either side, and thus abstracts from the elasticity-related issues studied in our
paper. Last, in a model related to that of Caillaud-Jullien, Jullien (2001) shows that an
entrant represents a much stronger competitive threat on an incumbent platform when
third-degree price discrimination is feasible. The ability to “divide and conquer” forces
profit down, so much so that the incumbent may prefer platform compatibility.
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2 Monopoly platform benchmark
The two-sided markets described heretofore differ is some respects, and we therefore should
not aim at capturing all specificities of all industries. Our strategy will be to include a
number of key ingredients common to our illustrations in a basic model, and then to
generalize our analysis in order to extend its relevance to various two-sided markets. For
the moment, we assume that end users incur no fixed usage cost and that platform pricing
is linear. This basic model is a good representation of the credit card market; the reader
may want to keep this in mind, although it will be clear that the insights have much
broader generality.4
Economic value is created by “interactions” or “transactions” between pairs of end
users, buyers (superscript B) and sellers (superscript S). Buyers are heterogenous in
that their gross surpluses bB associated with a transaction differ. Similarly, sellers’ gross
surplus bS from a transaction differ. Such transactions are mediated by a platform. The
platform’s marginal cost of a transaction is denoted by c ≥ 0.
In the absence of fixed usage costs and fixed fees, the buyers’ (sellers’) demand depends
only on the price pB (respectively, pS) charged by the monopoly platform. There are
network externalities in that the surplus of a buyer with gross per transaction surplus bB,
(bB − pS)NS depends on the number of sellers NS, but the buyers’ demand:
NB = Pr(bB ≥ pB) = DB(pB)
is independent of the number of sellers. Similarly, let
NS = Pr(bS ≥ pS) = DS(pS)
denote the sellers’ demand for platform services.
We consider in turn the case of a private monopoly, and that of a public monopoly
maximizing social welfare subject to budget balance.
4Note that a “transaction” between a cardholder and a merchant means that the payments is by card
rather than by cash.
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2.1 Private monopoly
A private monopoly chooses selects prices so as to maximize total profit:
pi = (pB + pS − c)DB(pB)DS(pS).
Assuming that DB and DS are log concave, it is easy to see that pi is also log concave
(jointly in (pB, pS)). Its maximum is characterized by the first-order conditions:
∂(log pi)
∂pB
=
1
pB + pS − c +
(DB)′
DB
= 0,
∂(log pi)
∂pS
=
1
pB + pS − c +
(DS)′
DS
= 0.
In particular:
(DB)′DS = DB(DS)′.
This condition characterizes the values of pB and pS that maximize volume for a given
total price p: The volume impact of a small (absolute) variation of prices has to be the
same on both sides. If we introduce the elasticities of quasi-demands:
ηB = −p
B(DB)′
DB
and ηS = −p
S(DS)′
DS
,
the private monopoly prices can be characterized by a two-sided formula that is reminis-
cent of Lerner’s formula:
pB + pS − c = p
B
ηB
=
pS
ηS
. (1)
In fact, the total price p = pB + pS chosen by the private monopoly is given by the
classical Lerner formula:
p− c
p
=
1
η
, or p =
η
η − 1c, (2)
where η = ηB + ηS, the total volume elasticity, is assumed to exceed 1. What is new in
formula (1) is the way in which this total price is allocated between the two sides of the
market:
pB =
ηB
η
p =
ηB
η − 1c, (3)
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and
pS =
ηS
η
p =
ηS
η − 1c. (4)
Proposition 1 : (i) A monopoly platform’s total price, p = pB + pS, is given by the
standard Lerner formula for elasticity equal to the sum of the two elasticities, η = ηB+ηS:
p− c
p
=
1
η
. (2)
(ii) The price structure is given by the ratio of elasticities (and not inverse elasticities):
pB
ηB
=
pS
ηS
. (5)
2.2 Ramsey pricing
We consider now the case of a Ramsey monopolist maximizing welfare subject to budget
balance, and derive the Ramsey formulae in our context5. The net surpluses on each side
for an average transaction are given by standard formulae:
V k(pk) =
∫ +∞
pk
Dk(t)dt
for k ∈ {B,S}.
Under budget balance, social welfare is highest when the sum of both sides’ net sur-
pluses:
W = V S(pS)DB(pB) + V B(pB)DS(pS),
is maximized subject to the constraint:
pB + pS = c.
The first-order, “cost allocation” condition is:
∂W
∂pB
=
∂W
∂pS
.
5A similar formula is derived in Laffont et al. (2001) in a model in which network externalities are
reaped through platform interconnection.
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This gives:
V S(DB)′ −DBDS = −DSDB + V B(DS)′.
After simplification, we obtain a characterization of Ramsey prices:
Proposition 2 : Ramsey prices embody the average surpluses created on the other side
of the market and are characterized by two conditions:
pB + pS = c (budget balance) (6)
and
pB
ηB
[
V B
DB
]
=
pS
ηS
[
V S
DS
]
(cost allocation). (7)
Condition (7) characterizes the price structure that maximizes social surplus for a
given total price p. Returning to the formula yielding the private monopolist’s price
structure,
pB
ηB
=
pS
ηS
, (1′)
the additional terms in formula (7) (the bracketed terms) reflect the average surpluses
per transaction for buyers and sellers. [Later, when we compare price structures across
governance forms, we will compare prices for a given price level. That is, we will say that
two governance forms generate the same price structure if they give rise to the same prices
for a given price level target p = pB + pS. Of course different governance forms generate
different price levels.]
3 Competing platforms
3.1 Modeling
We now assume that two platforms compete for the markets (we will also look at the case in
which both platforms are jointly owned, in order to compare the outcome under platform
competition with those obtained in section 2 in the private monopoly and Ramsey cases).
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End-users’ benefits. As earlier, buyers and sellers are heterogenous: Their benefits from
transacting vary across the two populations and are private information. These benefits
are denoted bBi for the buyer (when the transaction takes place on platform i) and b
S for
the seller, and are drawn from continuous distributions.6 The proportional fees charged
by platform i are pBi for buyers and p
S
i for sellers. A buyer with gross surplus b
B
i from
transacting on platform i is willing to use that platform provided that bBi ≥ pBi . However,
the buyer prefers to transact on platform j if bBj − pBj > bBi − pBi . Similarly, a seller with
type bS is willing to trade on platform i provided that bS ≥ pSi , and prefers to trade on
platform j if pSj < p
S
i .
Consider a (buyer, seller) pair. Without loss of generality we can assume that each
such pair corresponds to one potential transaction. A transaction however occurs only
if the two sides have at least one platform in common; that is, there exists at least one
platform on which both are willing to trade. If both “multihome” (are affiliated with
both platforms), the choice of platform is a priori indeterminate. In accordance with our
illustrations, we introduce a slight asymmetry between the two sides of the market by
assuming that, whenever a seller is affiliated with the two platforms, the buyer chooses
the one on which the transaction takes place.7
As an illustration, consider the case of payment cards. The buyer wants to purchase
a bundle of goods or services from the merchant at a certain price p. In our vocabulary,
a “transaction” takes place if and only if the buyer pays by card instead of using another
payment instrument (say, cash). Benefits bBi and b
S correspond to differences in utility
of buyers and sellers when they pay by card rather than cash. Under the No Surcharge
Rule (imposed by all payment card networks) the merchant is not able to charge differ-
ent retail prices for card and cash payments. Therefore the distributions of bBi and b
S
are independent of the prices chosen by platforms and merchants, and can be taken as
6For simplicity, we assume that the seller’s gross surplus does not depend on the platform where the
transaction takes place.
7This assumption is satisfied by most of our illustrations: a cardholder selects the card when the
merchant accepts multiple cards, the reader or viewer selects the newspaper, portal or TV network, the
videogame user selects the platform if the game is written for several consoles, etc.
12
